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The Case Against Rudolf Nureyev: A Legal Case Study of 
the KGB’s Pursuits against Defectors 
By Katherine Montana  
 
|Preamble| 
| This article will investigate the legal investigation against Rudolf Nureyev  
that led to his defection, as well as the legal limitations placed upon him by  
the USSR after permanently settling in the West. It will also track the legal  
pursuit of restrictions against the dancer by the KGB that lasted for almost  
his entire life. | 
 
‘One day, he is going to stay behind somewhere for good.’1 
These words, spoken by the Leningrad Kirov Ballet’s artistic director in 1959, 
could not have been more prophetic. On the trip back home from a competition 
in the West, rising Soviet ballet star Rudolf Nureyev accidentally missed the 
train from Kiev to Leningrad. Two years later, the dancer fulfilled Boris 
Fenster’s prediction.2 
Yet, despite the prediction by Fenster, it has been noted that Nureyev was likely 
not planning on defecting when he stepped on the plane from Leningrad to 
Paris.3 When trying to understand why Soviet artists would want to leave and 
stay away from their home country, some analysts use a more retrospective 
viewpoint by comparing defectors’ lives in the West, and noting that it was 
more liberating than their previous lives in the Soviet Union.4 Though it is clear 
that Rudolf felt as if he was strangled artistically in the USSR, evidence 
suggests that it was the KGB’s pursuits against him, both before, during and 
after his defection, were what made him decide to stay away from his country 
for almost the entirety of his adult life. This essay will use the story of this ballet 
dancer to argue that the KGB’s pursuits against defectors of the Soviet Union 
led to many not returning to their country not simply due to wanting to 
continue pursuing a life in the West, but to escape their harassment and 
punishments. 
 
1 ‘Interview with Alla Osipenko’, Interview by Julie Kavanagh in Julie Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev: The 
Life (Great Britain, 2007), p. 76. 
2 Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 75-77 
3 Diane Solway, Rudolf Nureyev: His Life (New York, 1998), pp. 234-236 
4 Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 112-113; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The KGB in 
Europe and the West: The Mitrokhin Archive (1999, London), p. 481; ‘Interview with Rudolf Nureyev’, 
Interview by Mavis Nicholson, Thamestv, Afternoon Plus, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kczUuX285n0 [accessed 4 October 2020] 
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Unsurprisingly, defection was and continues to be a legal minefield. Though 
the defections that bridged the gap between the dramatic Cold War split of the 
communist East and capitalist West are no longer an issue today, defections 
still take place all over the world. For example, there are many cases of North 
Koreans defecting to South Korea, and (occasionally) vice versa.5 
In 1961, Nureyev walked away from KGB guardsmen, informing Parisian 
policemen that he wanted to claim political asylum. Although a case against 
him had likely begun years before due to his many appreciations regarding 
Western culture and dismissive attitude towards Communist organizations. 
(He once stated to an undercover officer that the All-Union Leninist Young 
Communist League was not worth joining), However, it did not suddenly end 
when he decided to stay in France.6 The records of the Komitet 
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti still mostly remain a secret, yet copied reports 
smuggled out by other defectors and interviews with former members of the 
USSR allow us to paint a fairly accurate picture of the organization’s 
proceedings against Nureyev. The complicated legalities of international law 
made the KGB’s pursuits against Nureyev extremely complex, but the strong 
desire to punish the dancer’s disobedience and make an example out of him 
inspired the organization to skirt around French laws potecting asylum seekers 
and begin an intricate series of pursuits to not only try to bring him home, but 
end his career. This intricate series of covert pursuits by the KGB is due to the 
fact that nine years before his defection, France had become a part of the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ensuring that an asylum 
seeker’s ‘personal status’ was protected under France’s laws.7 
 
Born on a Russian train in 1938, Rudolf Nureyev can truly be described as a 
maverick. His talent for the art of dance allowed him to train with and 
 
5 Byung-Ho Chung, ‘Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in 
South Korea’, Korean Studies, 32 (2008), pp. 1-27. 
6 Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, p. 112. 
7 ‘Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’, United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High 
Commissioner, (28 July 1951), < 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx> [accessed 13 
November 2020]. 
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become a member of the prestigious Kirov Ballet, but his outspoken- often 
belligerent- and curious behaviour constantly got him into trouble. From 
refusing to dance unless he got to wear Western-style costumes, to openly 
disobeying and cursing at his instructors and superiors, Nureyev was viewed 
by the government as a threat. Due to the previously listed international 
regulations regarding political asylum seekers, there was almost nothing the 
KGB could do to legally force defectors home.8 Therefore, the organization 
resorted to scare tactics, persuasion, threats, and physical harm to both punish 
and lure former USSR citizens back. Arguably, this harassment made the KGB, 
an organization designed to defend the Soviet Union from what was considered 
potentially dangerous outside influence, ironically end up encouraging citizens 
to defect to and remain in this outside world.9 Rather than enticing the 
population to remain loyal to their country, the KGB caused great fear of 
potential arrests or execution, which in effect inspired those who had defected 
to continue to stay away. To support this argument, this essay will analyse the 
case and pursuits against Nureyev that not only forced him to leave his country 
but discouraged him from coming back. This notion of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy is proven by the fact that the strength of the KGB’s power actively 
parallels Nureyev’s desire to stay in the West, and with its weakening in the 
late 1980s, the dancer finally returned home.  
Nureyev was clearly fascinated with the West, yet biographers Julie Kavanagh 
and Diane Solway note that this does not prove that he was necessarily 
planning on leaving the USSR before his sudden defection.10 His career as a 
dancer in the Kirov was becoming more prominent, his connections to his 
family in Ufa, a city in southern Russia, were strong, and he had an intimate 
relationship with his dance teacher’s wife, Xenia Pushkin. His ties to the Soviet 
Union were secure, and the potential for greater freedom in the West does not 
wholly explain his desire to stay away. This is evidenced by his desire over his 
 
8 Susan L. Carruthers, ‘Between Camps: Eastern Bloc Escapees and Cold War Borderlands’, American 
Quarterly, 57:3 (2005), pp. 926-928. (actual 911-942); Charles B. Keely, ‘The International Refugee 
Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters’, The International Migration Review, 35:1 (2001), pp. 
303-314. 
9 Leonid Shebarshin, ‘Reflections on the KGB in Russia’, Economic and Political Weekly, 28:51 (1993), 
p. 2829. 
10 Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, p. 118; Solway, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 234-236. 
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years at the Kirov to bring Western-style dances and costumes to the East, 
proving that though he admired the West, he wanted to bring its culture to the 
USSR rather than simply leave his home country. Arguably, he ultimately had 
to be pushed to stay away for so long, and the KGB’s suspicions, case, and 
pursuits against him achieved this.  
We know that suspicions against him had begun, at minimum, a short while 
before he left for Paris. In an interview with the Kirov’s former prima ballerina, 
Gabriela Komleva noted that the decision to let Nureyev go to Paris was a 
complicated one, for he ‘always created tensions with the KGB’.11 Additionally, 
when a woman in charge of observing the Kirov for its upcoming tour insisted 
that Nureyev was ‘her star’ and ‘the best dancer of the world’ and should be 
allowed to go to Paris, the Minister of Culture stated that, ‘there have been 
some problems.’12 Because of his talent, however, he was eventually allowed to 
go on tour to the West, but not without supervision from the KGB. In an 
interview with his friend Tamara Zakrzhevskaya, the former citizen of the 
USSR noted that before he even left the airport in Leningrad, Nureyev was 
worried that he was under suspicion.13 When he started to blatantly ignore the 
rules of the tour, his file started to grow, and the KGB officer on the tour, Vitaly 
Strizhevsky, made snide remarks to put him down.14 Kavanagh notes that his 
new friend Pierre Lacotte swears that there was no plan to keep Nureyev in the 
West, but the KGB wrote off Lacotte and the French police in Nureyev’s trial 
(in which the defendant was absent) as the plotters of some kind of conspiracy 
that kept him away from the USSR.15   
Arguably, this scapegoating of the French was used to shift the blame away 
from the KGB itself, for if they had not pushed Nureyev to the point of no 
return, he likely would have not continued to stay away from the Soviet Union. 
During the KGB’s height of power, which aligned with the USSR’s political and 
academic prominence during the Cold War, this idea of scapegoating 
 
11 ‘Interview with Gabriela Komleva’, Interview by Richard Curson Smith, BBC, Rudolf Nureyev: Dance 
to Freedom. 
12 ‘Interview with Ariane Dollfus’, BBC, Rudolf Nureyev; Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 105-106. 
13 ‘Interview with Tamara Zakrzhevskaya’, BBC, Rudolf Nureyev. 
14 Solway, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 144-146; BBC, Rudolf Nureyev. 
15 Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 120, 138; Solway, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 234-236 
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foreigners as conspirators of treasonous activity is also evident in other cases 
against those who were considered traitors.16 There are several examples of 
this, but the most notable one references ballerina Natalia Makarova’s 
defection to Britain nine years after Nureyev’s own defection. After she 
defected, KGB files noted that the English media could be a culprit in her 
increasingly treasonous behaviour.17 By pinning blame on foreign forces, the 
organization ultimately failed to acknowledge their own role in scaring 
defectors from returning with their intense tactics.  
The KGB’s pursuits against Nureyev came to a climax the day that the Kirov 
was going to leave Paris for the next part of their tour in London. Strizhevsky 
had previously reported his behaviour to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, which led to the dancer being told that instead of going to 
London with the group, he must return to the USSR. It was then that Nureyev, 
understandably upset and worried, walked away from Strizhevsky and 
announced his plan to seek asylum. Kavanagh notes that the dancer’s 
excitement for London with the Kirov and his panic at not being able to go 
proves that his defection was unplanned, and without their suspicions 
culminating in a case against Nureyev and rousing panic, the rising star likely 
would have gone back home to Leningrad.18 
However, this was not the end of the case against him, but the beginning of a 
series of more nuanced and frightening approaches that arguably forced the 
dancer to stay away from his home. The Mitrokhin Archive, a series of KGB 
spy files smuggled out of the Soviet Union by Vasili Mitrokhin, proves this. 
Files note that the organization sent undercover spies to the West, who threw 
sharp objects on the stage during his first show in Paris, and the most sinister 
pursuit was an attempt to end his dancing career through physical assault.19 
Though these plots did not succeed in halting his career, it is clear that the KGB 
were not willing to give up on making an example of the dancer.  
 
16 Mark Solovey, ‘Introduction: Science and the State During the Cold War: Blurred Boundaries and a 
Contested Legacy’, Social Studies of Science, 31:2 (2001), pp. 165-170. 
17 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The KGB in Europe and the West, pp. 481-482. 
18 Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, p. 120. 
19 Ibid., pp. 9, 480-481. 
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With the rise of these strong and harsh approaches by the KGB towards 
Nureyev, the star’s desire to go back home arguably diminished more and 
more. Though there is evidence he missed his family and friends in the USSR, 
the KGB’s tactical pursuits that dodged international legal restrictions 
arguably scared him from returning. One of these attempts by the KGB was to 
lure him home. Mitrokhin notes that in directing those close to him to write 
letters that would purposefully make him homesick, the KGB hoped he would 
decide to come back to the Soviet Union.20 Ironically, this approach actually 
pushed him further away, for Nureyev suspected that these letters suggested 
insincerity. In fact, it has been noted that his friend from East Germany wrote 
a follow up letter to the ones that begged him to come home that told Nureyev 
that in actuality, it was not ideal for him to return.21 
Evidenced by Mitrokhin’s smuggled notes and statistics, the KGB’s power 
increased under the steady control of First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in the 
early 1960s, which allowed the organization to subsequently increase pressure 
on its defectors.22 Throughout the later years of Nureyev’s career in the West, 
which coincided with the decline of the Communist Party and KGB’s power in 
the East, his desire to return home proved stronger. This diminishment in 
power is evidenced by Mitrokhin noting that in later years, plots against artistic 
defectors weakened, and aggressive pursuits were no longer seen as essential.23 
This displays the notion that the KGB’s pursuits to both punish the ballet star 
and bring him home actually pushed him away, and their declined efforts due 
to the slow dissolving of the USSR’s power allowed Nureyev to finally feel 
comfortable to ask to return. In 1987, First Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was 
informed that Nureyev wanted to return home to say goodbye to his mother.24 
By allowing this visit during the years that the KGB and Communist Party were 
growing weaker, Gorbachev proved that the intensity of the case and pursuits 
against the dancer were in fact what ultimately kept him away from his home. 
 
20 Ibid., pp. 480-481. 
21 Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, pp. 206-207. 
22 Amy Knight, ‘The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union’, Journal of Cold War 
Studies, 5:1 (2003), pp. 67-69; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 9-10. 
23 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 727-728. 
24 Francis X. Clines, ‘For Nureyev, An ‘Inevitable’ Return Home’, The New York Times, New York City, 
15 November 1987, p. 4 < https://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/15/world/for-nureyev-an-inevitable-
return-home.html> [accessed 10 October 2020]. 
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Rudolf Nureyev’s case, as well as the legal approaches that the KGB used 
against him and other defectors, proves that defections were, and continue to 
be, extremely complicated affairs. Likely due to his understanding of the extent 
of the KGB’s power in the 1960s, the dancer acknowledged that though he 
knew his decision to defect would likely be a permanent one, it did not 
necessarily mean he would be content in the West.25 The amount of power that 
the organization held, which directly parallels the forcefulness of approaches 
against both potential defectors and those who had already left the Soviet 
Union, ultimately depreciated with the slow collapse of the USSR in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, letting cases grow cold and approaches grow warmer. 
Despite the pursuits against him and his unpatriotic attitude towards the 
USSR, the country was ultimately his home, and his strong connections with 
his friends, family and hometown were proved when he jumped at the chance 



















25 Spoken to Patrick Thevenon, Paris-Jour, 21 June 1961 in Kavanagh, Rudolf Nureyev, p. 147. 
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